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The Front national Vote in the Plural
The insoluble Front national equationBetween the French general election of 1981 and the 1995 presidential elec-
tion, the number of Front national (FN) voters increased from less than 100,000
to more than 4.5 million. With the exception of Austria, France is the only
country of the European Union in which a party of the extreme right, clearly
recognized as such by more than three-quarters of the electorate,1 has ob-
tained such stunning success at the ballot box. The numerous theories which
have been advanced over the past several years to explain the growth of FN
support can be divided into four groups.
The first centres on the FN leader and what Edwy Plenel and Alain Rollat
have called the 'Le Pen effect'.2 Here, Le Pen's personality, his demagogic
character and his talent for manipulating the media are crucial. For example,
his first appearance on Heure de verite (Hour of Truth) on 13 February 1984
increased voting intentions in his favour from 3.5 per cent to 7 per cent if the
barometer used by one of the principal French polling organization, Societe
francaise d'enquete par sondages (SOFRES), is anything to go by. This first set
of theories also includes some that examine the psychology of voters them-
selves, highlighting their authoritarian tendencies, both heterophobic and xeno-
phobic, as well as the repressed Oedipal fantasies which leave them so easily
susceptible to lepeniste rhetoric.3
A second group of explanations is based on social and economic fac-
tors. Certain theorists believe that immigration—particularly of North Afri-
cans and/or Muslims—triggered the FN vote among those living, against their
* This article was first published in French in Le Banquet. Revue du CERAP, no. 10, January-
June 1997, to whom we are grateful for permission to publish this English translation.
1 Immediately following the 1995 presidential election, 76 per cent of the electorate, and 70 per
cent of those who voted directly for Le Pen, placed the FN at the extreme right—indeed at the
seventh and final cell—of the left-right political scale; see the analysis of the survey con-
ducted following the 1995 presidential election by Centre d'étude de la vie politique française
(CCEVIPOF), L'electeur a ses raisons (Paris 1997).
2 Edwy Plenel and Alain Rollat, L'effet Le Pen (Paris 1984); see also Serge Dumont, Le système
Le Pen (Antwerp 1985).
3 In particular, see Jean-Louis Maisonneuve, L'extrême droite sur le divan, psychanalyse d'une
famille politique (Paris 1992); see also Pierre Jouve and Ali Magoudi, Les dits et les non-dits de
Jean-Marie Le Pen: enquêtes et psychanalyse (Paris 1988); on voter psychology, see Hugues
Lagrange and Pascal Perrineau, 'Le syndrome lepéniste', in Nonna Mayer and Pascal Perrineau
(eds.), Le Front National à découvert, 2nd edn. (Paris 1996), 228-48.
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will, next to communities with both different value systems and ways of life.
This theory, which Pierre Martin has recently reiterated in a publication by
the Saint-Simon Foundation,4 seems to be proved by the fact that, regardless
of the type of election, the geographical map of the FN vote coincides with the
local presence of foreigners (see maps 1-2). In addition, immigration is most
regularly proclaimed as a primary motive by the FN electorate itself. The most
radical formulation of this theory is given by Herve Le Bras in his 'Le Pen
equation': FNvote (%) = 6% + (1.7x foreigners (%)) + negligible residue. He
offers an anthropological interpretation of the equation based on a variety of
combinations (depending on the locality) of three fundamental forces: family
structures, local power structures and national power structures. According
to him, a map of the FN vote coincides with the
map of suicides at the beginning of the century, the map of wealth and population
migrations; it's basically the negative imprint of the map representing the distribu-
tion of the extended family structure.5 In those areas, which are entirely dominated
by Paris and where autonomous organizational authority no longer exists, the na-
tional identity crisis is most crucially felt.6
Those are the places where the FN leader's xenophobic discourse—largely di-
rected against foreigners whose distribution throughout French territory re-
mains, in fact, unaltered since the middle of the nineteenth century—is most
influential.
Other theorists focus on economic and social change, and their negative
consequences: unemployment, crime and instability. The map of the FN vote
represents an urban and industrial France crippled by the weight of its unem-
ployment crisis. In his analysis, Pascal Perrineau describes the FN vote as 'the
political echo of urban anomie', while Jerome Jaffre sees it as a 'vote of de-
spair by which the socially disadvantaged express their discontent'.7
The third category of explanations emphasizes cultural factors. Histo-
rians such as Pierre Milza have underlined the ideological relationship be-
tween the FN vote and the periodic revival of a 'protest temperament'. Milza,
for example, considers the solutions offered by the lepeniste party to be
drawn from the old package of national-populism, a movement of which fascism a
la frangaise was, in fact, only ever one case in point, and which has been success-
ively reincarnated in Bonapartism, Boulangism, anti-Dreyfusism, the 'revolution-
ary right' of the turn of the century, league nationalism and later Poujadism.8
4 Pierre Martin, Le vote Le Pen: l'électorat du Front national (Paris 1996).
5 The structure whereby several generations live together under one roof.
6 Hervé Le Bras, Les trois France (Paris 1986), 216, 219.
7 Pascal Perrineau, 'Front national: l'écho politique de l'anomie urbaine', Esprit, nos. 3-4, March-
April 1988, 22-38; Jérôme Jaffré, 'Front national: la relève protestataire', in Élisabeth Dupoirier
and Gérard Grunberg (eds.), Mars 1986: la drôle de défaite de la gauche (Paris 1986), 223-4.
8 Pierre Milza, Fascisme français passé et présent (Paris 1987), 421; see also Michel Winock (ed.),
Histoire de l'extrême droite en France (Paris 1993).
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Other theorists, like Piero Ignazi, describe the upsurge of extreme right-wing
parties in Europe as a 'silent counter-revolution', part and parcel of society's
neo-conservative reaction against the permissive and hedonistic values of the
1960s.9 The FN allows for the expression of the authoritarian, xenophobic and
security-seeking aspirations which developed in the mid-1970s and were never
sufficiently acknowledged by the governments of the day. It was Pierre-Andre
Taguieff who first devised the concept of 'national-populism'—the popular
form of the national-liberalism of the elites—for the specific identity crisis
provoked during the 1980s by the globalization of culture and the market, the
construction of Europe and the collapse of Communism.10
The fourth and final category of analyses focuses on the political factors
which have favoured the FN vote: the fears and deceptions aroused by the
left's rise to power; the inability of elected political representatives to find a
solution to unemployment; their increasing lack of credibility following a
long series of affairs and scandals; the passage of the amnesty laws; and the
general disorientation brought about by successive 'cohabitations' within the
French government. The FN vote has developed, ultimately, into a 'protest
phenomenon'. In this light, Jerome Jaffre describes it as both 'refusal power'
and 'a safety valve'—an alternative version, at the opposite end of the political
playing-field, of the dissenting role once played by the Communist Party."
The election calendar at the beginning of the 1980s was to greatly facilitate the
expression of this protest. As Piero Ignazi puts it: 'if the FN was able to come
out from isolation it was due first to the institutional stimulus provided by
the system of proportional representation, and, second, to the timing of elec-
tions, including a succession of local elections and by-elections followed by
risk-free national elections.'12 In addition, the European common market de-
bate and the Maastricht Treaty referendum clearly sharpened the feeling that
a gulf exists between the 'people' and the 'elite', a feeling that is to the FN'S
particular advantage.13
It is tempting to look for a single explanation for the FN phenomenon.
But whilst its leader's charisma, the presence of immigrants, the persistance of
unemployment and the crisis of political representation all play a role, none
of them on their own constitutes an explanation. When Le Pen entered the
political arena during the 1950s, it was the Poujadist movement which first
9 Piero Ignazi, 'The silent counter-revolution: hypotheses on the emergence of extreme right-
wing parties in Europe', European Journal of Political Research, vol. 22, no. 3, 1992, 3-34.
10 See, by Pierre-André Taguieff: 'La rhétorique du national-populisme', Cahiers Bernard Lazare,
no. 109, June-July 1984, 19-38; 'La rhétorique du national-populisme: les règles élémentaires
de la propagande xénophobe', Mots, no. 9, October 1984, 113-38; 'La tentation autoritaire en
France', Les Temps modernes, no. 465, April 1985, 1773-903; see also 'Nationalisme, réactions
identitaires et communauté imaginée', Homines et migrations, no. 1154, May 1992, 31-41.
11 Jaffré, 'Front national', 229 and Jérôme Jaffré, 'Le Pen ou le vote exutoire', Le Monde, 12
April 1988.
12 Piero Ignazi, 'Un nouvel acteur politique', in Mayer and Perrineau (eds.), 76.
13 See Gerard Grunberg, 'Les élections européennes en France', in SOFRES, L'Etat de l'opinion
1995 (Paris 1995), 81-101.
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benefitted from his skills as an orator and as a tribune of the people. How-
ever, despite these qualities which would later become his trademark, Le Pen
was beaten during the 1962 general election and endured relative political ano-
nymity until he was called to preside over the FN in 1972. While the party
enjoyed no electoral success during the following decade, Le Pen began in
those years to expound the very ideas which would later become so success-
ful. His slogan for the 1973 general election, for example, was 'Defend the
Frenchman'; his 1973 election platform promised to combat 'uncontrollable
immigration' and the degeneration of traditional French values.
The effects of economic crisis were felt in 1974 during the first petrol
shortage. At the same time France closed its borders, putting a sudden stop to
the ongoing immigration which had developed throughout the 'Thirty Glori-
ous Years', the years, since the mid-1940s, which had seen significant eco-
nomic and social progress. Francois Mitterrand's electoral success in 1981 could
hardly be expected to benefit, in the short run, an anaemic extreme right which
had been unable to participate in the election, and which had received only
0.4 per cent of the vote during the first round of the general election in the
same year.14
A chain of events led to the emergence and eventual electoral grounding
of the lepeniste party. The victory of the 'socialist-communists' in 1981, in a
country governed for twenty-three years by the right, was explosive. Their
first social reforms triggered a radicalization of the right-wing electorate; at
the same time their abrupt embrace of economic austerity marked the end of
their honeymoon with the left-wing vote. It is only at this moment that the
French seem to have become truly conscious of the economic crisis on their
hands and the inability of their political representatives to solve it.15 And it is
precisely at this moment that the rhetoric of the FN—making immigrants the
scapegoat for French society's anxieties—finds a buyer on the floor of the
electoral market.
The movement's political resources, in conjunction with both its adver-
sary's strategic errors and a variety of favourable institutional factors, guaran-
teed the FN'S longevity and provided it with room to manouevre unequalled
in other European countries. In this respect, a comparison between the ex-
treme right wings of various European countries (though paid scant attention
in France) reveals that yesterday's rapid rise in the electoral success of the
German Republikaner, and today's flourishing of the Austrian Freiheitliche
Partei Osterreichs (FP6) or the Dutch Vlaams Blok are both fed by the same
economic crises, the same political disillusionment, as well as the same fears
caused by globalization, the opening of borders and migratory fluidity that
14 In 1983, Jean-Christian Petitfils would conclude his book, L'extrême droite en France (Paris
1983) as follows: 'Fragmented into a myriad of tiny islands, powerless coteries, phantom
sects, the [extreme right] survives as no more than a historical relic' (123).
15 On the time-lag between the beginning of the crisis and its actual perception by the French,
and on the 'collapse of belief during 1982-3, see especially Elie Cohen, 'Les socialistes et
l'économie: de l'âge des mythes au déminage', in Dupoirier and Grunberg (eds.), 81-101.
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nourished the FN. These various manifestations of the phenomenon differ only
in the rhythm of their waxings and wanings, and in their scale, and according
to the particularities of each political system and its political agenda: includ-
ing both the type of state and the type of electoral and party system, the spe-
cific resources of far-right parties (leadership, programme, organization,
support network) and the strategies of their opponents (alliance or isolation,
condemnation or appropriation).16
The myth of the typical voter
The variability of all these elements over time and place is another reason
why any analysis of the FN vote in the singular is misleading. While electoral
sociology has progressed considerably, thanks to polling, the face of the FN
electorate still remains largely invisible, a fact due both to its low numbers
and to its reluctance to expose itself. For example, in any standard 1,000-
person sample representing the French electorate, the FN—even where its elec-
toral presence is highest—accounts for less than 100 individuals.17 As far as
possible, therefore, this account will rely on the unique and partially unedited
data of two studies conducted by the Centre d'etude de la vie politique francaise
(CEVIPOF) immediately following the presidential elections of 1988 and 1995
respectively.18 Representing national samples of more than 4,000 individuals,
these surveys provide a detailed social, cultural and political profile of those
who admitted to voting for Le Pen. They numbered 357 in 1988 and 435 in
1995. Among voters admitting to their choice in the first rounds, the FN force
increased from 10.9 per cent in 1988 (thus underestimating the FN candidate's
actual score by 3.5 points) to 13.5 per cent (a 1.5 point underestimation). This,
in itself, is proof of the FN voter becoming a feature of everyday life.
16 On the need to recognize what he calls the 'structure of political opportunities', see notably
Herbert Kitschelt and Anthony McGann, The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Compara-
tive Analysis (Ann Arbor 1995); see also the numerous comparative works on the extreme
right in Europe, in both English and German: Klaus Von Beyme (ed.), Right-wing Extremism
in Western Europe (London 1988); Hans-Georg Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism in West-
ern Europe (New York 1994); Peter H. Merkl and Leonard Weinberg (eds.), Encounters with
the Contemporary Radical Right (Boulder, CO 1993); Jürgen W. Falter, Hans-Gerd Jaschke
and Jürgen R. Winkler(eds.), Rechtextremismus. Ergebnisse und Perspektiven der Forschung,
a special issue of Politische Vierteljahresschrift, vol. 27, 1996. Little comparative research of
this type has been conducted in France, with the exception of the now-dated study by Anne-
Marie Duranton Crabol, L'Europe de l'extrême droite: de 1945 à nos jours (Brussels 1991). A
useful inventory of the European far right is presented in Jean-Yves Camus and Centre
européen de recherche et d'action sur le racisme et l'antisémitisme (eds.), Extrémismes en
Europe (La Tour d'Aigues 1997).
17 Exit polls conducted at voting centres on election day represent several thousand electors.
However, since only voting centres of a certain size are covered (thus under-representing
farmers and people living in rural areas) and since the questionnaires themselves are self-
completed (which poses a problem for the elderly and allows for imprecise replies to 'profes-
sion'), these surveys remain inherently biassed.
18 Post-presidential election surveys conducted 9-20 May 1988 and 9-24 May 1995, using face-
to-face interviews by SOFRES pollsters with national representative samples of the electorate
(N=4032 and N=4078). See CEVIPOF, L'électeur français en questions (Paris 1990) and L'électeur
a ses raisons.
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Immediately following the European elections of 1984—which had seen
Le Pen's ticket supported by 11.2 per cent of valid votes—Le Nouvel
Observateur painted a mocking portrait of Jean-Marie Le Pen's prototypi-
cal supporter:
He's a man in his fifties, he runs a small shop in Paris or in a large city in the
provinces. Unless, of course, he's executive manager of a small firm, or even a me-
dium-sized one. He's a man who feels good about life; he's got his degree under his
belt, in business or technology. And he's Catholic, though not excessively. He makes
it to church for special occasions, and wouldn't miss Midnight Mass on Christmas
Eve for anything in the world. He's put his kids into private schools, and calls it
'free choice'.19
In today's quite different portrait of the FN voter—embodying a 'France of
popular despair'20—the worker and the 'poor white trash' from the suburbs
replace the shopkeeper. Neither of these depictions is satisfactory however.
No electorate is homogeneous, and the FN electorate is no exception. As early
as 1984, the lepeniste party received electoral support from all sectors of the
population, across all age-groups and from every kind of social milieu (see
table 1). Of course, certain categories are wont to be more supportive than
others, although not necessarily the same ones at all times.
There is only one characteristic which appears consistently throughout
the FN electorate: namely, masculinity. Regardless of the election, far fewer
women than men vote for the FN. Women are traditionally less inclined to
support extremist movements of any kind; furthermore, they are suspicious
of a party which both militantly opposes abortion rights and encourages the
'weaker' sex to return to the home. Other characteristics of the FN electorate
have changed over time. In 1984 Le Pen's ticket was supported by the middle
classes, by managers (14 per cent), owners of small businesses and white-col-
lar workers (17 and 18 per cent of valid votes), and foremen (19 per cent). The
FN leader obtained his best results, however, amongst the privileged and edu-
cated, including industrialists and large-scale shopowners (26 per cent), where
his score was directly proportional to the size of the firm, liberal profession-
als (19 per cent) and practising Catholics: in other words, amongst social cat-
egories traditionally of the right.21 As such, the moderate right formed the
very core of the 1984 FN electorate, with more than half of its members claim-
ing to have voted for Giscard d'fistaing during the second round of the 1981
presidential election, and comprising a majority of supporters of the main-
stream right-wing parties, the Rassemblement pour la republique (RPR) and
the Union pour la democratic franchise (UDF).
19 Le Nouvel Observateur, 22 June 1984.
20 Pascal Perrineau, 'La dynamique du vote Le Pen: le poids du gaucho-lepénisme', in Pascal
Perrineau and Colette Ysmal (eds.), Le vote de crise (Paris 1995), 244.
21 See Elisabeth Dupoirier, 'L'électorat français, le 17 juin 1984', in SOFRES, Opinion publique
1985 (Paris 1985), 207-30 (exit poll by SOFRES in 1984 for the television channel TF1 and for
Le Nouvel Observateur).
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On the other hand, during the 1986 general elections, the FN was aban-
doned by one-third of the electorate that it had gained during the European
elections. With 88 per cent of these defectors voting for UDF-RPR candidates,
their places were filled by electors who had previously either voted for the
left or abstained. These were younger individuals, working-class and without
any attachment to religion.22 Consequently, the percentage of former Giscard
supporters in the FN electorate fell to 43 per cent during these 1986 elections,
and then, on the eve of the 1988 presidential elections, to 33 per cent of Le
Pen's potential electorate. The percentage of UDF and RPR sympathizers simi-
larly dropped from 39 per cent to 12 per cent in 1988. The representation of
former Francois Mitterrand supporters stabilized at about one-third, whilst
the recent influx of young, less-politicized voters—individuals who had not
voted in 1981—increased their proportion of representation from 13 per cent
to 34 per cent.23 Le Pen's elevated score during the 1988 presidential election
thus reflected the union of these two electorates, the one bourgeois, the other
working-class; Le Pen was making headway not only amongst liberal profes-
sionals and executives, but also amongst blue-collar workers and, most im-
portantly, proprietors of small businesses, of whom a record 27-30 per cent
were polled as his supporters.
Between the 1988 and 1995 presidential elections, although the size of
the FN'S electorate remained practically unaltered, it underwent two impor-
tant—and contradictory—changes. The FN'S popularity has today diminished
from 27 per cent to 14 per cent amongst small-scale business owners who are
now more inclined to be attracted by the Chirac candidacy. On the other
hand, the FN'S current success among the working class has forced it into com-
petition with the left on its own territory. This trend was reflected in the first
round of the 1995 presidential election in which 18 per cent of white-collar
workers, 25 per cent of the unemployed and 30 per cent of blue-collar work-
ers voted for Le Pen, revealing a progression of 11 and 22 points respectively
since the 1984 European elections among the unemployed and blue-collar
workers (see table 1). As with any survey data, these results should be inter-
preted with caution, particularly since the findings of various institutes differ
from 1 to 8 points with regard to the support of blue-collar workers. All
findings, without exception, confirm the proletarianization of the FN elector-
ate, however, discrepancies reflecting only a different reading of the scope of
the phenomenon. The 1997 general elections reinforced this trend. While to-
day's Front national may no longer be, as in 1995, France's 'First Workers'
Party', it received its best result thanks to this social category which sup-
ported it with almost one-quarter of its total votes (see table 1).
22 Data from exit poll sponsored by Bull/Brulé Ville Associés, 16 March 1986 for Radio Monte
Carlo, Paris Match, Libération and Antenne 2 (N=2837); see also Mayer and Perrineau (eds.),
266-7 (table).
23 Jérôme Jaffré, 'Trois postulats sur l'électorat d'extrême droite. Ne pas se tromper sur Mon-
sieur Le Pen', Le Monde, 26 May 1987 (SOFRES post-election surveys 1984 and 1986, plus
various pre-election surveys from April 1987 (N=3000)).
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Table 1. Evolution of the FN electorate (1984-1997)
FNVOte
%
Total
Sex
Men
Women
Europ.
84
11
14
8
Gen.
86
10
11
9
Pres.
88
14.5
18
11
Gen.
88
10
12
7
Europ.
89
12
14
10
Gen.
93
13
14
13
Europ.
94
10.5
12
9
Pres.
95
15.5
19
12
Gen.
97
15
19
12
Age
18-24 years
25-34 years
35-49 years
50-64 years
64 years and older
10
11
12
12
10
14
10
11
9
16
17
17
11
12
15
9
8
10
10
12
15
12
18
10
13
13
13
10
15
10
12
7
18
18
15
17
9
16
19
15
16
12
Profession
Farmer 10 17
Shopowner, craftsman,
company manager 17 16
Executives, professionals 14 6
Managers, white-collar workers 15 11
Blue-collar workers 8 11
Unemployed, retired 9 8
13
27
19
13
19
12
6
10
8
19
9
18
11
9
15
13
13
15
6
13
18
12
12
6
9
21
9
16
14
7
16
30
11
20
10
15
24
15
Status
Self-employed
Public sector
Private sector
Unemployed
Retired
13 13
8 8
15 14
21
11
17
12
12
7
9
13
10
7
14
13
12
12
16
12
6
4
17
28
9
11
15
21
25
11
12
15
17
15
15
Educational level*
Primary 8 8 15 7 13 17 7 14 17
Secondary 12 15 13 12 14 16 16 17 14
Technical/commercial 17 12 18 12 11 14 16 21 19
Higher 11 7 12 10 9 8 5 9 10
Religion
Regularly practising Catholic 14 7 7 5 15 12 8 10 7
Irregularly practising Catholic 6 8 16 10 12 12 6 12 13
Non-practising Catholic 13 12 17 11 12 13 13 18 19
No religion 5 7 9 9 10 15 11 14 17
Source: post-electoral SOFRES survey, N=2000, and soFREs/Liberation/cEvipor/cRAPs/cmsp sur-
vey, 26-31 May 1997, N=3010 (see note 27)
* 'Educational level' is determined by the last institution attended, except in 1997 when this
information is based on the highest-ranking diploma received.
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The post-presidential election survey by CEVIPOF provides a profile of
the lepeniste proletariat. The FN president seems most successful among male
blue-collar workers aged 18-25 who are politically undecided and who live
and work in urban surroundings where the themes of immigration and crime
are most relevant. Representing the most underprivileged sector of society,
both socially and culturally, they have not pursued higher education and are
in possession of no more than a vocational qualification. These are individu-
als who do not own property and whose monthly salary does not exceed FF
7,500—if they're lucky enough to be employed. Notably, it is among unem-
ployed workers that FN support approaches within a hair's breadth of 40 per
cent.
The FN'S electoral success in this area has essentially been achieved at the
expense of the left, and specifically the socialist left.24 In a survey of 100 blue-
collar workers voting for Le Pen in 1995, almost 50 per cent declared having
voted for Mitterrand in the second round of the 1988 presidential election, as
opposed to 22 per cent for Chirac, with one-fifth either abstaining or having
been too young to vote. The first signs of instability within the working-class
electorate appeared between the 1981 and 1986 general elections when the left
lost 12 points among blue-collar workers. A more brutal loss of 20 points
then took place between the 1988 and 1993 general elections. This point de-
cline testifies to general disarray within the French working class, a social
category which has been particularly affected by industrial restructuring and
the ongoing economic crisis, and which has lost faith in the ability of the left
to find solutions. Its support amongst the working population decreased from
38 per cent to 31 per cent between the censuses of 1982 and 1990, while un-
employment increased from 9.6 per cent to 14.2 per cent.
Ironically those categories most seriously affected by unemployment—
and thus most likely to vote for Le Pen—include those previously regarded as
the left's traditional stronghold: skilled traditional workers engaged by large
firms in sectors such as automobile and arms manufacture, shipbuilding, min-
ing or metallurgy. Furthermore, over time, white-collar workers have seen
24 The data from available surveys which polled the lepéniste electorate on their vote during the
preceding election, as well as the results of detailed contextual analyses carried out at the
cantonal and communal level, reveal that the influence on the Communist vote has always
been marginal; see, notably, François Platone and Henri Rey, 'Le FN en terre communiste', in
Mayer and Perrineau (eds.), 249-67; also Henri Rey, Les évolutions du comportement électoral
dans les quartiers de grands ensembles (Paris 1990) and La peur des banlieues (Paris 1996).
The decline of the Communist vote, which was principally to the socialists' advantage, began
well before the FN'S electoral breakthrough. If ever a transfer of vote from the Communists to
the FN does occur, it will probably be, for example, after an intermediate stages of abstaining
or supporting the non-Communist left. As Jérôme Jaffré notes: 'in the French political sys-
tem, there is almost a phenomenon of functional substitution between the two forces' (Jaffré,
'Front national', 229). While they are not, particularly where the young are concerned, neces-
sarily ex-Communist voters, those individuals who cast their votes in Le Pen's direction often
have the same social and cultural profile as those who supported the Parti communiste français
(PCF) when it accounted for 15-20 per cent of the electorate.
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both their working conditions and the very nature of their professions change
drastically. In today's world, two out of five workers are employed in the
service sector as, for example, drivers, packers or warehouse workers; the
same holds for service industry trades such as temping and cleaning. Those
positions have become increasingly isolated and precarious, as the distinc-
tion between white- and blue-collar worker is eroded and they are without
any tradition of trade unionism and collective action, making such workers
all the more vulnerable to lepeniste rhetoric.25
Electoral geography confirms the findings of the surveys. With each
successive presidential election, the FN has increased its vote in areas such as
Lorraine, Picardie, Nord-Pas-de-Calais, Champagne and Ardennes —that
is, in regions most scarred by the industrial restructuring of the 1970s and
1980s and where the gradual decline of the socialist vote has been most ap-
parent. Between constituencies, a strong correlation (+ .73) also exists be-
tween lepeniste gains and socialist losses between 1988 and 1995.26
Blue-collar workers who vote for Le Pen thus issue a significant warn-
ing call to the left, even though they may remain, for the most part, still
attached to it. According to the 1995 CEVIPOF survey, 50 per cent of them
consider themselves on the left half of the left-right political scale, 60 per
cent declare an affinity with a left-wing party, and 54 per cent voted for
Jospin during the second round. However, while these supporters may re-
spond to the rhetoric of security and xenophobia with the same enthusiasm
as other lepeniste voters, they are distinct in their leftist leanings towards
egalitarianism, and support for redistribution in the economic and social
domains.
The reasons for the FN vote
An analysis of the forces motivating the FN electorate only confirms its di-
versity. While electors overwhelmingly categorize Jean-Marie Le Pen and
his party as an extreme right-wing entity, they do not consider themselves
to be likewise extremists. Asked to place themselves on a seven-point left-
right political scale, Le Pen supporters spread themselves across the entire
range, with 17 per cent in the three cells to the left, 28 per cent at the centre,
and 54 per cent to the right. Only 15 per cent of lepenistes—in 1995 as well
as in 1988—actually placed themselves on the extreme right of the scale, on
the seventh and final cell (a rate which, while remaining a minority, is three
times higher than in the sample as a whole). In addition, lepenistes do not
identify with a political party which the majority (70 per cent) of them clas-
25 On transformations within the working class, see Alain Chenu, 'Une classe ouvrière en crise',
in Institut national de la statistique et des études economiques (INSEE), Données sociales 1993
(Paris 1993).
26 On a departmental level, the correlation between the electoral evolution of the Parti socialiste
(PS) and the FN, in successive presidential elections, is .78, with that of the PCF being .15; these
relationships are confirmed on a cantonal level. See Perrineau, 'La dynamique du vote Le
Pen', 254-6.
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sify—as does their leader—as being far right. Asked to choose the party to
which they felt 'the closest or the least alienated', only one-third of sup-
porters selected the FN.27 In fact, they seem relatively untouched by the fLe
Pen effect'. When asked, in 1995 as well as in 1988, what had been the primary
reason for their vote, lepenistes were the least inclined among all electors to
cite their candidate's personality (14 per cent against 23 per cent in the sample
as a whole), with only slightly more than one-quarter of them actually wish-
ing to see Le Pen one day elected president.28 For the vast majority of electors
in 1988, it was not the man, his party or any sense of belonging to a political
family which counted. The reason given for their vote, at an overwhelming 78
per cent (as opposed to 65 per cent in 1995), was, in fact, 'his views'.
These views are well known. Regardless of the election, immigration
and crime head the list of reasons for voting FN, even though since 1995—as
distinct from the trend observed in 1988—unemployment has become a pri-
mary preoccupation, coming five points ahead of immigration, and thus re-
flecting the FN'S progress amongst the working class (see table 2).29 But while
FN electors are most widely characterized by a pronounced rejection of all
minorities—including Jews, Arabs and foreigners in general—they remain
especially hostile to immigrants.30 This predisposition is not, however, neces-
sarily indicative of forced contact with immigrant communities. Regardless
of the period of time under consideration, any correlation which might be
found at a departmental level between the FN vote and the local presence of
27 This figure has, however, clearly risen, indicating the normalization and increasing stability
of this electorate (post-electoral survey conducted on a representative national sample of the
electorate, in conjunction with SOFRES/Libération/CEVIPOF/Centre de recherches
administratives, politiques et sociales (CRAPS), Lille/Centre d'informatisation des données socio-
politiques (CIDSP), Grenoble, 26-31 May 1997; see also Libération, 3 June 1997).
28 On the eve of the first round of the 1988 presidential election, only 28 per cent of those
intending to vote for Le Pen thought that their candidate would win, a much smaller propor-
tion than among all the other electorates, and almost the same number of Le Pen voters that
expected Chirac, Barre or Mitterrand to win (26, 16 and 17 per cent, respectively) (SOFRES
survey conducted for a group of regional newspapers, 1 -2 April 1988; see Jaffré, 'Le Pen ou le
vote exutoire'). The same phenomenon was evident in 1995 when only 27 per cent of Le Pen's
electorate imagined that their candidate would be elected (exit poll conducted by Institut
français d'opinion publique (IFOP)/Libération, 23 April 1995, N=5347).
29 Similarly, the two problems which counted most for FN electors during the first round of the
1997 general election were immigration and unemployment (the latter given by 67 per cent of
supporters, as against 22 per cent of the general electorate), followed by crime (65 per cent, as
against 25 per cent) (exit poll by Conseils, sondages, analyses (CSA)/France3/France Info/Le
Parisien Aujourd'hui, 25 May 1997, on a nation-wide sample of 4,046 first-round voters).
30 Although Le Pen's electorate was the one most inclined to think that the 'Jews have too much
power in France' (37 per cent, as against 21 per cent in the total sample) during the 1988
presidential election, its antisemitism remains relatively mild in comparison with its anti-
immigrant fixation (the proportion of those who 'agree completely' that there are too many
immigrants reached 75 per cent, as against 35 per cent in the total sample, representing a
divergence of 40 points). On the other hand, antisemitism is much more apparent amongst
the movement's leaders. This was illustrated by a survey of delegates to the 1990 FN congress
in which 88 per cent declared that Jews 'had too much power' (see Colette Ysmal, 'Les cadres
du Front national: les habits neufs de l'extrême droit', in SOFRES, L'état de l'opinion 1991
(Paris 1991), 181-98).
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Table 2. Hierarchy of problems by electorate
Problems :$^
 & •<$* J? . ^ s
(% of highest marks) \> *> V *^O* CA "S?
International relations 13 12 14 5 20 17
Crime 20 28 23 13 28 32
The welfare state 46 56 41 31 30 32
Immigration 14 19 14 13 21 22
Salaries and
purchasing power 41 55 34 26 28 23
Education of youth 42 55 45 37 42 38
Unemployment 69 69 60 60 59 54
Working hours 24 29 28 24 13 13
European union 10 11 21 17 13 14
The environment 16 20 21 48 15 16
AIDS 38 46 40 38 37 34
Corruption 37 42 32 26 32 35
Social disadvantage 44 51 42 43 34 28
,.,<?
19
29
29
22
27
36
56
15
8
14
31
35
27
17
44
34
53
39
38
58
17
8
15
41
43
36
15
27
35
22
32
41
57
19
14
18.5
37
33.5
36
Source: 1995 CEVIPOF survey: responses to question: 'Here are a selection of problems that cur-
rently face France. Using the scale below, please mark each problem 1-10 depending on the im-
pact it had on your vote during the first round of the presidential election.'
foreigners disappears when considering geographic units which are smaller
and, consequently, more homogeneous. Focusing on the canton, commune,
quartier or block throws into relief other factors, both social (urbanization,
the presence of employed or unemployed workers) and political (the absence
of local leaders, the loss of community networks, the decline of local activ-
ism).31 Even at the departmental level, this correlation is in decline; it decreased
from .79 at the European election to .61 at the general elections of 1986 and
1988. This was followed by a decline to .67 during the presidential election of
1988, and to .43 during that of 1995. In other words, the presence of foreign-
ers, North Africans or others, is neither a prerequisite nor a justification for
voting for Le Pen.
The same phenomenon can be observed with regard to crime. A study
carried out in 1985 in the Grenoble region revealed that FN electors were actu-
31 See notably Pascal Perrineau, 'Le Front national: un electorat autoritaire', Revue politique et
parlementaire, vol. 87, no. 918, August 1985, 24-31; Nonna Mayer, 'Le vote FN de Passy à
Barbès', in Mayer and Perrineau (eds.), 249-67; Henri Rey and Jacques Roy, 'Quelques
reflexions sur l'évolution d'un département de la banlieue parisienne', Hérodote, vol. 43, De-
cember 1986, 6-38.
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ally the group least likely to have fallen victim during the preceding three
months either to robbery (3 per cent, as against 4 per cent in the total sample),
to mugging (3 per cent, as against 7 per cent) or to threats and insults (6 per
cent, as against 8 per cent). It was, however, the members of this group, in
greater numbers than any other, who felt themselves to be more exposed to
danger than they had been in the past (90 per cent, as againt 45 per cent in the
total sample), including in their own homes (42 per cent, as against 29 per
cent).32 A more recent study conducted by the Institut des hautes etudes de la
securite interieure (IHESI) found that individuals with an affinity for the FN
exhibited feelings of insecurity not only with respect to crime and delinquency,
but also, in a more general manner, with reference to all the risks of modern
society, including pollution, drugs, fire accidents or AIDS. All of these fears
seem to crystalize around the presence of immigrants, with the FN acting as
catalyst.33
To understand such fears, it is important to note that the lepeniste voters
possess fewer social and political resources than others. Since the 1986 gen-
eral elections, the educational level recorded of members of the FN has been
systematically lower than that of other electorates. In 1995 three-quarters de-
clared that they possessed certification of less status than the baccalaureat
(equivalent to A-level), as opposed to two-thirds of the total sample. It is,
nonetheless, well known that an individual's fears vary in inverse relation to
his or her cultural level: the lepenistes seem both extremely isolated socially
and cocooned inside close family relationships. In this way, they accurately
mirror the phrase so often cited by Jean-Marie Le Pen: 'I like my daughters
better than my cousins, my cousins better than my neighbours and my neigh-
bours better than strangers' {Heure de verite, 2 March 1984).
The 1995 electors felt the least likely to be able to count on their family,
neighbours, associations or elected representatives in a sudden crisis. In addi-
tion, they were less disposed towards collective action in the name of solidar-
ity and a common cause (strikes, demonstrations, sit-ins etc.), and least often
declared having interests in common with members of the same neighbour-
hood, the same region, or even the same age, gender and profession. Over-
whelmingly disassociated from religious practice (unlike electors of the
32 See the study conducted by Hugues Lagrange and Sébastian Roché on a sample of 1,293
individuals representing members of the Grenoble population aged eighteen and older, Feb-
ruary-March 1986 (Hugues Lagrange and Sébastian Roche, Baby Alone in Babylon (Grenoble
1987) and Hugues Lagrange and Pascal Perrineau, 'Le syndrome lepéniste', in Mayer and
Perrineau (eds.), 231.
33 See the survey of French attitudes to problems of security, carried out in October 1989 for the
IHESI; under the direction of Annick Percheron, this study was conducted as part of a number
of surveys for the Observatoire interrégional du politique, and included 17,400 individuals
representative of the French population aged fifteen and older (national sample of 2,000 and
22 regional samples of 700). See Nonna Mayer, 'Le vote FN OU le syndrome de la peur', Revue
internationale d'action communautaire, vol. 30, no. 70, autumn 1993, 117-22. In 13 of the 15
questions about fear-inducing situations, the FN sympathizers were more often afraid than
the sample's average, scoring a record 42 points above the sample average with respect to
'immigrants'.
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moderate right), the lepenistes denied themselves recourse even to religion as
a last resort. Finally, they displayed the least confidence in politics, remaining
convinced that political representatives were 'not at all' concerned with peo-
ple like themselves (82 per cent, as against 68 per cent), that notions of left and
right 'didn't mean anything any more' (80 per cent, as against 69 per cent) and
that voting 'didn't make much of a difference' (25 per cent, still a minority, as
against 13 per cent).
Apart from these general characteristics which distinguish the FN voters
from others, a multiplicity of other reasons for the FN vote can be found at the
very heart of this electorate. The gap separating lepenistes coming from the
right or extreme right from those either coming from the left or without af-
filiation is crucial. These groups share neither the same social or cultural pro-
file, nor the same value system. By deconstructing the electorate—that is, by
taking the Le Pen electorate which participated in the first round of the 1995
presidential election and dissecting it according to its members' votes in the
1993 general elections—one can expose this complex internal composition.
Such a manoeuvre reveals that only about one-quarter of the electorate
is composed of loyal supporters who voted for FN candidates in 1993 and
subsequently for Le Pen in 1995. These individuals represent the hard-core
nucleus of lepenisme: they are extremist (40 per cent place themselves on the
extreme right of the left-right political scale), partisan (66 per cent describe
the FN as the party most closely representing their ideals) and devoted to Le
Pen (40 per cent rank him at the top of the scale measuring supporters' sym-
pathy for their candidates). This is also the least working-class electorate.
Thirty-one per cent compose a second group of lepenistes who sup-
ported the party in 1995, but who voted for the UDF-RPR in 1993. This elector-
ate is more bourgeois, more socially and economically privileged, more
educated. It is also the most religiously-inclined group, with 71 per cent being
either regularly or irregularly practising Catholics. For the most part, its mem-
bers place themselves to the right of the left-right political scale (51 per cent
on the fifth and sixth cells, only 9 per cent on the extreme right); instead of
identifying most closely with the FN, they prefer less extremist right-wing
parties, particularly the RPR (preferred by 48 per cent, as opposed to 15 per
cent preferring the FN). Eighty-two per cent of those among this group who
voted during the second round chose Chirac, their values remaining those of
the moderate right: liberal vis a vis the economy, conformist vis a vis moral-
ity, conservative vis a vis society.
The third group of lepenistes, a minority of 14 per cent, represents those
who in 1993 voted for either a left-wing or Green party candidate. Forty-nine
per cent of its members place themselves on the left of the political scale, and
36 per cent at its centre. They identify most strongly with left-wing parties—
particularly the Parti socialiste (PS)—and voted most often for Jospin during
the second round. In keeping with the characteristics traditionally demon-
strated by left-wing electors, they are largely low-income white- and blue-
collar workers who are rarely property owners. Other features include a low
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level of education, a high rate of unemployment and a general detachment
from religious practice. This group's value system is diametrically opposed to
the previous two groups, with great weight being given to social support and
wage-earners' rights. They are also egalitarian, in favour of state intervention
in the economy and morally less conservative. Half of these left lepenistes (as
against one-third of right lepenistes) are opposed to privatization; two-thirds
condemn profit (as against one-third); and four out of five (as against half)
believe that priority should be given to wage increases.
The final group, comprising 31 per cent of the total FN electorate, is
composed of lepenistes who did not vote in 1993. It shares the same under-
privileged social and cultural profile as the third group, the same indifference
to religion and the same concern over wage-earners' rights. It is distinguished,
however, by its youth (71 per cent are aged under forty, as against 48 per cent
of the left lepenistes), its lack of political integration and its relative feminization
(48 per cent are women, as against 35 per cent). This electorate contains the
greatest number of individuals who feel no particular affinity for any one
party (one-quarter, as against 3 per cent of left lepenistes) and who believe
that voting doesn't make a difference (34 per cent, as against 26 per cent).
Judging by their position on the left-right political scale (60 per cent place
themselves at the centre or just to the right of it) and by their pronounced
support for Chirac (chosen by 69 per cent of those who voted during the
second round), this group as a whole is more right-wing than the preceding one.
Despite Pierre Martin's opinion (cited above), the phenomenon which
Pascal Perrineau describes as 'leh-lepenisme' does indeed exist if one under-
stands it to mean those electors who have switched from voting for the left to
voting for Le Pen. Accordingly, 14 per cent of those who supported Le Pen
during the first round of the 1995 presidential election had previously voted
for a left-wing or Green candidate at the 1993 general elections. And 35 per
cent had voted for Mitterrand during the second round of the 1988 presiden-
tial election. These 'leh-lepenistes' display a certain left-wing sensibility as far
as social and economic policy is concerned. Their numerical presence—and
that, more generally, of the working class—among the lepeniste electorate
explains why its attitudes as regards economic and social issues appear more
closely affiliated with the left than the right. Accordingly, the 'leh-lepenistes'
of 1995 were just as likely as loyal left-wing supporters to believe that the
state interfered too much in economic and social affairs (48 per cent and 49
per cent, as against 59 per cent of right-wing electors), or to claim that their
concern over salaries and purchasing power greatly influenced their vote (50
per cent and 51 per cent, as against 40 per cent among right-wingers). While
'leh-lepenistes' were more likely to criticize profits and privatization and to
defend wage-earners' purchasing power, these 'turncoats' have, however, man-
aged to part company with a large chunk of the left's message, particularly
where the values of universalism and tolerance are concerned. As a result,
when the death penalty or immigration is at issue, 'leh-lepenistes' no longer
differ from lepenistes coming from the right.
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Map 1. Proportion of foreigners (%) among the total population in 1990 (by
department)
Sample: total population aged 18 and older
Source: EDEN/1990 census
Map 2. Rate of change (%) between the FN vote in the 1993 and in the 1997
general elections (first round, by department)
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This socio-cultural diversity within the FN electorate combines with a
number of local circumstances (see map 2). From the North to Bouches-du-
Rhone, from Vendee through Alsace and up towards the region of Paris, the
size of the Le Pen vote and its raisons d'etre vary greatly. In some areas, the
'protest phenomenon' explains its success,34 in others, the presence of a local
political leader partial to the FN, and elsewhere, from the Garonne valley to
the Mediterranean Midi, the confrontation between immigrants and repatri-
ated colonials from North Africa still nostalgic for French Algeria. And occa-
sionally, the arrival of a mobile garrison unit in an area is enough to inflate the
FN vote to record size.35
Let us consider a few of these local situations. Vitrolles, a recently-built
city which stretches along ten kilometres of motorway, is both overwhelmed
by anarchic urbanization and exhausted by an unemployment rate which af-
fects one out of five employable residents. These factors no doubt contrib-
uted to its being the last town to date to be conquered by the FN. However,
the decisive reason for the FN victory was probably the unpopularity of
Vitrolles's previous mayor. The campaign of the incoming Megret and his
wife focused on the weaknesses of the incumbent's management and on the
theme of his 'total corruption'.
At Dreux, the FN'S laboratory, first Jean-Pierre Stirbois, and then his wife,
systematically played on people's fear of immigrants. Not insignificantly, three-
quarters of the entire department's foreign population is concentrated within
three quartiers of this city. The 'scarf affair' at Creil College provided Madame
Stirbois with the slogans, 'No to chador at school!' and 'No to mosques!', which
greatly facilitated her being elected deputy during the 1989 by-election.
The rise of the FN in Nord-Pas-de-Calais, a region characterized by its
longstanding working-class traditions, illustrates the increasing
proletarianization of the FN'S supporters from one presidential election to the
next. Taking advantage of the collapse of the PS, the FN fares best in the old
industrial heartlands where large metallurgy, mineral and textile firms have
closed down.36
The situation is quite different in Alsace however. This rich region which
has been relatively free of unemployment looks out, geographically, on to
Europe. Although its foreign population is only slightly more numerous than
in the rest of France (8 per cent of the regional population, as against 6.7 per
cent elsewhere), lepeniste supporters are on the upsurge, even in rural areas
which contain no foreigners at all. In this case, the Le Pen vote would seem to
reflect a certain retreat into a regional identity, in an area with particularly
34 See notably Jean-Philippe Roy, Le Front national en region Centre: 1984-1992 (Paris 1993).
35 In the Beauvert quartier of Grenoble where barracks were set up in 1981 for the gendarmerie
(who consequently accounted for one-third of the local electorate), the FN consistently has its
best results.
36 See Valérie Lafont, Un Nouvel Electorat populaire pour Jean-Marie Le Pen: étude du vote FN
dans le Nord-Pas-de-Calais, 1988-1995, doctoral dissertation, Institut d'études politiques, Paris,
1996.
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strong cultural and linguistic traditions and, by virtue of its proximity to the
French border, more exposed to globalization and to Europe.37
Finally, Brittany is exemplary of those regions where the FN has diffi-
culty winning more than 9 per cent of the votes. Its 'resistance' can be ac-
counted for by the virtual non-existence of immigrants, by Catholicism's
moderating influence and, in this region of migrants, by the Breton identity
itself. The FN is nonetheless able to make some electoral progress in those
parts of the region most marked by unemployment and where cultural tradi-
tions have lost their footing, such as the seaside communes of Finistere and
Morbihan, as well as the rural communes of Pllle-et-Vilaine where a protest
vote supports the extreme right.38
The lepenisation of hearts and minds
There are various ways to evaluate the FN'S electoral potential. One method is
to add up all the individuals who have already voted for it at least once: about
one-quarter of the French population.39 This figure, however, reflects past
electoral behaviour which will not necessarily be repeated. Neither does it
account for individuals who have never voted for Le Pen but could be tempted
to do so in the future. Another possible means of evaluation is provided by
the responses of members of the population to the question: 'Is there a party
in the following list whom you would not vote for under any circumstances ?'
In the 1988 CEVIPOF survey, 67 per cent of the sample answered that the FN
was such a party, revealing, on the other hand, that one-third of the French
electorate are potential supporters. In 1993, this number of respondents rose
to 73 per cent, leaving 27 per cent of electors thus susceptible to voting FN.40
An electoral potential of as much as one-quarter of the total French electorate
could thus be at the FN'S disposal if, at the same time, the party was capable of
uniting its diverse extremist, bourgeois and working-class factions.
Furthermore, a relationship exists between the above figures and data
measuring the sphere of influence of the FN'S views. Bearing in mind that this
influence stretches well beyond the confines of the FN electorate, SOFRES has
regularly posed the following survey question over the past ten years: 'Would
you describe yourself as agreeing completely, partially agreeing, partially disa-
greeing, or totally disagreeing with the views put forward by the FN?' Since
1984, the proportion of voting-aged individuals who describe themselves 'in
agreement' has oscillated around the one-quarter mark (see graph 1). One
should note, however, that the popularity of FN views dropped by six points
37 See the report on the FN in this region in Saisons d'Alsace, no. 129, autumn 1995.
38 Jean-Luc Richard, 'L'"extrême Ouest" loin de l'extrême droite: le vote Front national dans le
Finistère', Revue française de science politique, vol. 46, no. 5, October 1996, 792-816.
39 This figure, the one most often cited by the press, is Jérôme Jaffré's estimate, based on the
crossovers between electorates from one election to the next, calculated using data from the
SOFRES post-electoral surveys (1984-95).
40 See the survey by SOFRES/Libération, 23-5 February 1993, using a nation-wide sample of 1,000
individuals of voting age.
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between 1996 and 1997, reaching an even lower level than in 1984. This de-
clining popularity is, significantly, discernible in regard to the FN'S favourite
themes of immigration and security: the proportion of those 'in agreement'
dropped from 33 per cent and 35 per cent to 25 per cent and 26 per cent,
respectively. These examples show that one can overstate the so-called
'lepenisation of hearts and minds'.
The FN'S electoral and ideological progress is not without limits, and the
Le Pen vote still undeniably contains a 'protest dimension', a sign of instabil-
ity. For example, this was the only 1995 presidential electorate (apart from
that of Arlette Laguiller) in which a majority admitted 'voting against other
candidates' rather than specifically 'expressing support' for a chosen candi-
date (47 per cent and 39 per cent, respectively, as against 32 per cent and 61
per cent of the total sample). Whereas the FN electorate principally owes its
existence to the popularity of the the party's views, its members are not nec-
essarily convinced that Le Pen or his party will put these views into action, at
least not on a national level.41 Locally, however, the FN'S conquest of cities
such as Toulon, Orange, Marignane and Vitrolles has begun to raise the pres-
tige of party representatives, a fact which could well modify its future image.
Significantly, the above proportions were reversed during the 1997 general
elections when 46 per cent of FN electors declared that they voted 'to support
the candidate of their choice' during the first round, and only 38 per cent 'to
oppose other candidates' (as against 58 per cent and 28 per cent, respectively,
of the total sample).42
Le Pen is neither credible nor endearing. The public's increasing fear of
him is reflected by responses to the SOFRES survey question posed since 1983:
'Do you think that Jean-Marie Le Pen and his party represent a danger for
democracy in France?' Just before the 1984 European elections, the propor-
tion of the public who foresaw danger equalled those who did not. By au-
tumn 1995, however, and following the FN'S success in the European and
cantonal elections, the danger-spotters had become the majority. The dissemi-
nation of the FN leader's speech on the radio programme Grand jury (RTL/Le
Monde, September 1987)—the speech which managed to render the extermi-
nation of six million Jews commonplace by calling it 'a detail'—increased the
proportion of danger-spotters by ten points, to two-thirds of the potential
electorate. This score has not decreased since that time. After the partial elec-
tion in Vitrolles, it increased to a record 75 per cent (see graph 2).
41 Post-electoral SOFRES survey, 20-23 May 1995, N=2000. This lack of confidence is further
confirmed by an IFOP/Le Figaro Magazine survey (14-19 March 1997) which studied a sub-
sample of 403 people who declared that they voted for Le Pen at least once in the preceding
ten years: 84 per cent said that when they did vote FN it was 'to reject other parties' rather than
'to support the FN' (as against 13 per cent); only 30 per cent hoped that Jean-Marie Le Pen
would actually become president of the Republic, and a mere 47 per cent hoped that an FN
leader would become prime minister (see Le Figaro Magazine, 28 March 1997).
42 CSA/France3/France Info/Le Parisien Aujourd'hui exit poll (see note 29).
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Graph 1: Would you describe yourself as agreeing completely/partially
agreeing/disagreeing with the views of Jean-Marie Le Pen?
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Graph 2: Do you think that Jean-Marie Le Pen and his party represent a
danger for democracy in France?
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A parallel evolution can be seen in the proportion of electors who cat-
egorically refuse to vote for the FN and who reject an electoral union between
this party and the UDF and RPR.43 This pronounced disapproval of the FN and
of its leader varies according to the electoral category. It is expressed most
frequently by young people, by women, by the most educated and most po-
liticized members of the electorate (executive managers, professionals) and
by left-wing sympathizers and voters. However, across all age-groups and all
socio-professional categories, amongst men as well as women, and taking in
the entire political spectrum from the Parti communiste francais (PCF) to the
RPR, the majority of individuals refuse both to vote for the FN and to ally
themselves with it, and are opposed to its possible seizure of state power.
The lepeniste party's success has provoked a backlash, as evidenced by
the increased number of anti-FN street demonstrations as well as by the pro-
liferation of specialized organizations determined to fight the FN and what it
stands for. In addition to SCALP (Sections carrement anti-Le Pen, Completely
Anti-Le Pen Sections, created in 1984), Ras 1'Front ('Nuff of the Front) and
Manifeste contre le FN (Anti-FN Manifesto, 1990), numerous associations have
sprung up in the towns which the FN won in 1995. Examples include Alerte
Orange (Orange Alert), Observatoire mediterraneen des libertes (Mediterra-
nean Watchtower of Freedom), Coordination toulonnaise pour la defense des
valeurs republicaines (Toulon Association for the Defence of Republican Val-
ues) and Toulon Debout (Toulon, Arise). The lepeniste party's behaviour dur-
ing their congress in Strasbourg (29-31 March 1997) provoked a new rash of
resistance organizations, such as Front citoyen (Citizen Front), Justice et liberte
(Justice and Liberty) and Culture and liberte (Culture and Liberty).
Several hundred such collective organizations exist today, accounting
for thousands of activists. In Grenoble, 25,000 of them protested the FN lead-
er's visit by marching the streets of the city on 9 December 1996. And this
figure was doubled by demonstrators in Strasbourg where the rally against
Le Pen's 1997 congress was both national and European thanks to the partici-
pation of English, German, Belgian and Swiss organizations.44 The popula-
tion which supports these anti-FN organizations is, signficantly, in no way
confined to the left. Fifty-four per cent would support 'a large protest move-
ment against the Front national's views', even if only 18 per cent of them
would be 'prepared to participate in it'.45
43 On the evolution of this perspective since 1983, see Nonna Mayer and Pascal Perrineau, 'Le
lepénisme dans l'opinion: la puissance et le rejet', in SOFRES, L'état de l'opinion 1993 (Paris
1993), 63-78.
44 On anti-FN organizations, see especially Le Cahier du CEVIPOF, no. 13, September 1995, and
also Alternatives non violentes, no. 98, spring 1996, and 'Le local fait front', a special edition
of Territoires, no. 376, March 1997.
45 Telephone survey by the polling institute IPSOS for Le Figaro and France 2, 21-2 February
1997 (N=956): 18 per cent would be prepared to participate, 36 per cent would be supportive
without participating, 20 per cent were indifferent to the problem, 21 per cent opposed the
protest, and 5 per cent had no answer.
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In the end, however, the FN'S future will be played out on electoral and
political terrain. Its fate will depend on the successes of its opponents: in fielding
irreproachable candidates and devising credible programmes, in reviving lo-
cal activism and remobilizing local voters, and in taking advantage of the FN'S
weaknesses, particularly the left-right split which characterizes its electorate.
Instead of bridging the gap between these factions by moral indignation and
hyperbolic rhetoric on the themes of immigration and insecurity, the FN'S ad-
versaries should focus on—and expose—the contradictions represented by
this left-right split, with a view to prompting the party's collapse.
The use of hyperbole regarding immigration and instability has actually
created a justification for Le Pen's arguments. The views of the FN achieved
their highest recorded popularity (32 per cent) in the period following Jacques
Chirac's evocation of the 'noise and smell' of the foreign family living next to
the French worker (Orleans, 19 June 1991). That, in conjunction, three months
later, with Valery Giscard d'Estaing's description of the immigrant 'invasion'
in Le Figaro Magazine (September 1991) (see graph 1). The focus on immi-
gration and insecurity has thus leavened political debate with the FN'S choice
themes, despite the fact that the general electorate's real preoccupation re-
mains unemployment (see table 2).46
The 1997 general election confirms this. The economic and political hopes
of the voters—expectations which the right has failed to meet—were rein-
vested in the left which was accordingly returned to power. Eighty-one per
cent of electors were in favour of increasing the minimum wage by FF 1,000
per month; 71 per cent hoped that 350,000 jobs would be created for youth;
and 64 per cent wanted the working week reduced to thirty-five hours with-
out a drop in salary.47 By virtue of its focus on these leftist desiderata,, the PS
managed in part to reappropriate the working-class support which had previ-
ously been usurped by the FN. But, to keep it, it will need to keep its promises.
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